Fernanda Mendoza Cequeña & Ruperta Mendoza Lirio v. Honorata Mendoza Bolante, G.R. No. 137944, April 6, 2000

FACTS:

The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Binangonan.

The facts not disputed revealed that prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza, father of respondent and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. Petitioners were the daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. Respondent is the present occupant of the land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, respondent and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of petitioners, during the cadastral survey had a dispute on the ownership of the land.

After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of .petitioners.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court.

 

ISSUE:

Who was the lawful owner and possessor of the land subject of the case?

 

RULING:

The respondent.

Preference of Possession

The CA ruled that the respondent was the preferred possessor under Article 538 of the Civil Code because she was in notorious, actual, exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985. Petitioners dispute this ruling. They contend that she came into possession through force and violence, contrary to Article 536 of the Civil Code.

Despite their dispossession in 1985, the petitioners did not lose legal possession because possession cannot be acquired through force or violence. To all intents and purposes, a possessor, even if physically ousted, is still deemed the legal possessor. Indeed, anyone who can prove prior possession, regardless of its character, may recover such possession. 

However, possession by the petitioners does not prevail over that of the respondent. Possession by the former before 1985 was not exclusive, as the latter also acquired it before 1985. The records show that the petitioners' father and brother, as well as the respondent and her mother were simultaneously in adverse possession of the land.

Before 1985, the subject land was occupied and cultivated by the respondent's father (Sinforoso), who was the brother of petitioners' father (Margarito), as evidenced by Tax Declaration No. 26425. When Sinforoso died in 1930, Margarito took possession of the land and cultivated it with his son Miguel. At the same time, respondent and her mother continued residing on the lot.

When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his name in 1953 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by the respondent.

Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners' father acquired joint possession only in 1952.

 

Possession of Better Right

Finally, the petitioners challenge the CA ruling that "actual and physical coupled with the exclusive and continuous possession [by respondent] of the land since 1985" proved her ownership of the disputed land. The respondent argues that she was legally presumed to possess the subject land with a just title since she possessed it in the concept of owner. Under Article 541 of the Code, she could not be obliged to show or prove such title.

The respondent's contention is untenable. The presumption in Article 541 is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is proven. That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and possession is different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in one of the ways provided by law.

To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription.

Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner — public, peaceful, and uninterrupted— had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through prescription.

In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.

We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was established before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against the state and other interested parties.

However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel has no legal basis.