Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 18, 2017

FACTS:

On 1 September 2011, DMCI acquired a lot in the City of Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, for the construction of DMCI Torre de Manila condominium project.

The City of Manila's Office of the Building Official granted DMCI a Building Permit.

On 24 July 2012, the City Council issued Resolution No. 121 enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the Building Permit of DMCI, citing that "the Torre de Manila Condominium, based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point."

On 16 January 2014, the City Council issued Resolution No. 5, Series of 2014, adopting Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A. The City Council resolution states that "the City Council of Manila finds no cogent reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the MZBAA and hereby ratifies and confirms all previously issued permits, licenses and approvals issued by the City Council of Manila for Torre de Manila."

 

ISSUE:

Does the enjoinment of the construction of Torre de Manila impairs property rights?

 

RULING:

YES. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.

In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service Commission, the Court held that "what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done, except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I public order." This principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to protect the weak against the strong, the minority against the majority, and the individual citizen against the government. In essence, this principle, which is the foundation of a civilized society under the rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act can be curtailed only through law. Without this principle, the rights, freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically trampled upon by the shifting passions of those who can spout the loudest, or those who can gather the biggest crowd or the most number of Internet trolls. In other instances, the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would lead to a more equitable solution to the controversy. However, it is the law itself - Articles 1306 and 1409(1) of the Civil Code - which prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or public policy are allowed if also not contrary to law.

In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre de Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs, and public order" or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary, the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila project.

There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or determining the background sightline that is supposed to be protected or that is part of the "physical integrity" of the Rizal Monument. How far should a building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument - one, two, three, four, or five kilometers? Even the Solicitor General, during the Oral Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does not prescribe how sightline is determined, neither is there any way to measure by metes and bounds whether al construction that is not part of the historic monument itself or is outside the protected area can be said to violate the Rizal Monument's physicalintegrity, except only to say "when you stand in front of the Rizal Monument, there can be no doubt that your view is marred and impaired." This kind of a standard has no parameters and can include a sightline or a construction as far as the human eyes can see when standing in front of the Rizal Monument. Obviously, this Court cannot apply such a subjective and non-uniform standard that adversely affects property rights several kilometers away from a historical sight or facility.

 

The TRO must be lifted.

Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights and prevent further injury until final adjudication on the merits of the case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the KOR are not well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO lifted.

The general rule is that courts will not disturb the findings of I administrative agencies when they are supported by substantial evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired vested rights in the various permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for in order to build a 49-storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the City of Manila's zoning ordinance.

As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to review discretionary decisions or actions of administrative agencies in the absence of proof that such decisions or actions were arrived at with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa, we held that mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party from the use and enjoyment be a right to which he is clearly entitled. Only specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and certain. If the legal rights of th6 petitioner are not well-defined, definite, clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. Stated otherwise, the writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to perform a duty already imposed.

In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in discretionary acts of the executive department in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, and considering that mandamus may only be issued to enforce a clear and certain legal right, the present special civil action for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued earlier must be lifted.

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