Knights of Rizal v. DMCI Homes, Inc., G.R. No. 213948, April 18, 2017
FACTS:
On 1 September 2011, DMCI acquired a lot in the City of
Manila, located near Taft Avenue, Ermita, for the construction of DMCI Torre de
Manila condominium project.
The City of Manila's Office of the Building Official granted
DMCI a Building Permit.
On 24 July 2012, the City Council issued Resolution No. 121
enjoining the Office of the Building Official to temporarily suspend the
Building Permit of DMCI, citing that "the Torre de Manila Condominium,
based on their development plans, upon completion, will rise up high above the
back of the national monument, to clearly dwarf the statue of our hero, and
with such towering heights, would certainly ruin the line of sight of the Rizal
Shrine from the frontal Roxas Boulevard vantage point."
On 16 January 2014, the City Council issued Resolution No.
5, Series of 2014, adopting Zoning Board Resolution Nos. 06 and 06-A. The City
Council resolution states that "the City Council of Manila finds no cogent
reason to deny and/or reverse the aforesaid recommendation of the MZBAA and
hereby ratifies and confirms all previously issued permits, licenses and
approvals issued by the City Council of Manila for Torre de Manila."
ISSUE:
Does
the enjoinment of the construction of Torre de Manila impairs property rights?
RULING:
YES.
There is no law prohibiting the construction of the Torre de Manila.
In Manila Electric Company v. Public Service
Commission, the Court held that "what is not expressly or impliedly prohibited by law may be done,
except when the act is contrary to morals, customs and I public order." This
principle is fundamental in a democratic society, to protect the weak against
the strong, the minority against the majority, and the individual citizen
against the government. In essence, this principle, which is the foundation of
a civilized society under the rule of law, prescribes that the freedom to act
can be curtailed only through law. Without this principle, the rights,
freedoms, and civil liberties of citizens can be arbitrarily and whimsically
trampled upon by the shifting passions of those who can spout the loudest, or
those who can gather the biggest crowd or the most number of Internet trolls.
In other instances, the Court has allowed or upheld actions that were not
expressly prohibited by statutes when it determined that these acts were not
contrary to morals, customs, and public order, or that upholding the same would
lead to a more equitable solution to the controversy. However, it is the law
itself - Articles 1306 and 1409(1) of the Civil Code - which
prescribes that acts not contrary to morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy are allowed if also not contrary to law.
In this case, there is no allegation or proof that the Torre
de Manila project is "contrary to morals, customs, and public order"
or that it brings harm, danger, or hazard to the community. On the contrary,
the City of Manila has determined that DMCI-PDI complied with the standards set
under the pertinent laws and local ordinances to construct its Torre de Manila
project.
There is no standard in Ordinance No. 8119 for defining or
determining the background sightline that is supposed to be protected or that
is part of the "physical integrity" of the Rizal Monument. How far
should a building like the Torre de Manila be from the Rizal Monument - one,
two, three, four, or five kilometers? Even the Solicitor General, during the
Oral Arguments, conceded that the ordinance does not prescribe how sightline is
determined, neither is there any way to measure by metes and bounds whether al
construction that is not part of
the historic monument itself or is outside the protected area can be
said to violate the Rizal Monument's physicalintegrity,
except only to say "when you stand in front of the Rizal Monument, there
can be no doubt that your view is marred and impaired." This kind of a
standard has no parameters and can include a sightline or a construction as far
as the human eyes can see when standing in front of the Rizal Monument.
Obviously, this Court cannot apply such a subjective and non-uniform standard
that adversely affects property rights several kilometers away from a
historical sight or facility.
The
TRO must be lifted.
Injunctive reliefs are meant to preserve substantive rights
and prevent further injury until final adjudication on the merits of the
case. In the present case, since the legal rights of the KOR are not
well-defined, clear, and certain, the petition for mandamus must be dismissed
and the TRO lifted.
The general rule is that courts will not disturb the
findings of I administrative agencies when they are supported by substantial
evidence. In this case, DMCI-PDI already acquired vested rights in the various
permits, licenses, or even variances it had applied for in order to build a
49-storey building which is, and had been, allowed by the City of Manila's
zoning ordinance.
As we have time and again held, courts generally hesitate to
review discretionary decisions or actions of administrative agencies in the
absence of proof that such decisions or actions were arrived at with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
In JRS Business Corp. v. Montesa, we held
that mandamus is the proper remedy if it could be shown that there was neglect
on the part of a tribunal in the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty, or there was an unlawful exclusion of a party
from the use and enjoyment be a right to which he is clearly entitled. Only
specific legal rights may be enforced by mandamus if they are clear and
certain. If the legal rights of th6 petitioner are not well-defined, definite,
clear, and certain, the petition must be dismissed. Stated otherwise, the
writ never issues in doubtful cases. It neither confers powers nor imposes
duties. It is simply a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.
In sum, bearing in mind the Court does not intervene in discretionary acts of the executive department in the absence of grave abuse of discretion, and considering that mandamus may only be issued to enforce a clear and certain legal right, the present special civil action for mandamus must be dismissed and the TRO issued earlier must be lifted.
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