People of the Philippines v. Aquilino Andrade, et al., G.R. No. 187000, November 24, 2014
FACTS:
A random drug test was conducted in the National Bilibid
Prison wherein the urine samples of 38 inmates were collected and subjected to
drug testing, and out of that number, 21 urine samples tested positive.
After confirmatory tests done, those 21 urine samples, which
included that of herein respondents, yielded positive results confirming the
result of the initial screen test. Necessarily, the 21 inmates were charged
with violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165 under identical
Informations.
All respondents pleaded "Not Guilty" to the crime
charged.
On August 29, 2006, respondents filed a Consolidated Motion
to Dismiss on the ground that the facts alleged in the Information do not
constitute a violation of Section 15, RA 9165, which reads:
6. A strict reading
of the provisions of Section 15, Article II, RA 9165 reveals that the accused
did not commit the offense charged. Under RA 9165, the offense of Violation of
Section 15 thereof is committed by a person apprehended or arrested for using
dangerous drug, and who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug
after a confirmatory test.
7. In the case at
bar, the accused were never apprehended or arrested for using a dangerous drug
or for violating the provisions of RA 9165, which would warrant drug testing
and serve as basis for filing the proper information in court. In fact, the
accused were merely called to the Maximum Security Conference Hall in the
morning of June 30, 2003 and with 17 other inmates made to undergo drug
testing, pursuant to the directive of then Sr. Usec. Santiago. It was only
after they were found positive for dangerous drugs that the information for
Violation of Section 15, RA 9165 was filed against each of them.
8. Section 36,
Article III, RA 9165 further enumerates the persons subject to mandatory and
random drug tests, who if found positive after such drug test shall be subject
to the provisions of Section 15. National penitentiary inmates or inmates of
the Bureau of Corrections are not included in the enumeration. Thus, even if
the accused have been found positive in the mandatory or random drug test
conducted by BUCOR, they cannot be held liable under Section 15.
9. Assuming for the
sake of argument, but not admitting, that the accused were apprehended or
arrested for using a dangerous drug or for violating the provisions of RA 9165
which led to the June 30, 2003 screen test, or that the accused are subject to
mandatory or random drug testing, the drug test would be invalid absent a
showing that the same was conducted within 24 hours after the apprehension or
arrest of the offender through a confirmatory test within 15 days receipt of
the result in accordance with the provisions of Section 38, Article II of RA
9165.
10. In the case,
the accused were not informed of the results of the screening test, thus
depriving them of the right to challenge the same through a confirmatory drug
test within the required 15-day period after receipt of the positive result.
The RTC, before the scheduled hearing date for pre-trial and
trial, issued an Order granting respondents' Consolidated Motion to
Dismiss.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA.
The CA, in its Decision dated May 29, 2008, affirmed the
trial court's Order.
ISSUE:
Whether
the Court of Appeals erred when it held that private respondents may not be held
liable for violation of Section 15, Article II of RA 9165
RULING:
The
ground relied upon by respondents in their "Motion to Dismiss," which
is, that the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute an offense, is
actually one of the grounds provided under a Motion to Quash in Section 3 (a), Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
It must be emphasized that respondents herein filed their
Motion after they have been arraigned. Under ordinary circumstances, such motion
may no longer be allowed after arraignment because their failure to raise any
ground of a motion to quash before they plead is deemed a waiver of any of
their objections. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 9. Failure to
Move to Quash or to Allege Any Ground Therefor. - The failure of the accused to
assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a),(b), (g), and
(i) of Section 3 of this Rule.
However, since the ground asserted by respondents is one of
the exceptions provided under the above-provision, the timeliness of the filing
is inconsequential. The mistake lies in the RTC's dismissal of the case.
The RTC judge went beyond her authority when she dismissed
the cases based on lack of probable cause and not on the ground raised by
respondents, to wit:
Section 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure plainly states that in a motion to quash, the court shall not
consider any ground other than those stated in the motion, except lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged. In the present case, what the
respondents claim in their motion to quash is that the facts alleged in the
Informations do not constitute an offense and not lack of probable cause as ruled
by the RTC judge.
The RTC judge's determination of probable cause should have
been only limited prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest and not after
the arraignment. Once the information has been filed, the judge shall then
"personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence" to determine whether there is probable cause to issue a
warrant of arrest. At this stage, a judicial determination of probable cause
exists.
Considering that the RTC has already found probable cause,
it should have denied the motion to quash and allowed the prosecution to
present its evidence and wait for a demurrer to evidence to be filed by
respondents, if they opt to, or allowed the prosecution to amend the
Information and in the meantime suspend the proceedings until the amendment of
the Information without dismissing the case.
Section 4, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure clearly states that if the ground based upon is that "the facts
charged do not constitute an offense," the prosecution shall be given by
the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment, thus:
Section 4.
Amendment of the complaint or information. - If the motion to quash is based on
an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by
amendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made.
If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an
opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if
the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information
still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment.
If the defect in the information is curable by amendment,
the motion to quash shall be denied and the prosecution shall be ordered to
file an amended information. Generally, the fact that the allegations in
the information do not constitute an offense, or that the information does not
conform substantially to the prescribed form, are defects curable by amendment. Corollary
to this rule, the court should give the prosecution an opportunity to amend the
information. In the present case, the RTC judge outrightly dismissed the
cases without giving the prosecution an opportunity to amend the defect in the
Informations. In People v. Talao Perez, this Court ruled that,
"...even granting that the information in question is defective, as
pointed out by the accused, it appearing that the defects thereof can be cured
by amendment, the lower court should not have dismissed the case but should
have ordered the Fiscal to amend the information." When there is any doubt
about the sufficiency of the complaint or information, the court should direct
its amendment or that a new information befiled, and save the necessity of
appealing the case on technical grounds when the complaint might easily be amended.
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