People of the Philippines v. Arnel Alicando, G.R. No. 117487, December 12, 1995

FACTS:

Appellant Arnel Alicando was charged with the crime of rape with homicide.

On June 29, 1994, appellant was arraigned guilty.

On July 20, 1994, the trial court found appellant guilty and sentenced him to death.

 

ISSUE:

Whether the accused was validly arraigned


RULING:

NO. We find that the Decision of the trial court sentencing the appellant to death is shot full of errors, both substantive and procedural. The conviction is on an amalgam of inadmissible and incredible evidence and supported by scoliotic logic.

First. The arraignment of the appellant is null and void. The trial judge failed to follow section (1) (a) — of Rule 116 on arraignment. Said section provides:

Sec. 1. Arraignment and plea; how made. —

(a) The accused must be arraigned before the court where the complaint or information has been filed or assigned for trial. The arraignment must be made in open court by the judge or clerk by furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses, reading the same in the language or dialect known to him and asking him whether he pleads guilty or not guilty. The prosecutor may, however, call at the trial witnesses other than those named in the complaint or information.

The reading of the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him is a new requirement imposed by the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It implements the constitutional right of an appellant ". . . to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him."3 The new rule also responds to the reality that the Philippines is a country divided by dialects and Pilipino as a national language is still in the process of evolution.4 Judicial notice can be taken of the fact that many Filipinos have limited understanding either of the Pilipino or English language, our official languages for purposes of communication and instruction. 5 The importance of reading the complaint or information to the appellant in the language or dialect known to him cannot thus be understated.

In the case at bar, the records do not reveal that the Information against the appellant was read in the language or dialect known to him. The Information against the appellant is written in the English language. It is unbeknown whether the appellant knows the English language. Neither is it known what dialect is understood by the appellant. Nor is there any showing that the Information couched in English was translated to the appellant in his own dialect before his plea of guilt.

Second. The plea of guilt made by the appellant is likewise null and void. The trial court violated section 3 of Rule 116 when it accepted the plea of guilt of the appellant. Said section provides:

Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. — When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence in his behalf.

The records reveal how the trial judge inadequately discharged this duty of conducting a "searching inquiry." Section 3 of Rule 116 which the trial court violated is not a new rule for it merely incorporated the decision of this Court in People vs. Apduhan, Jr., and reiterated in an unbroken line of cases. The bottom line of the rule is that the plea of guilt must be based on a free and informed judgment. Thus, the searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. The records do not reveal any information about the personality profile of the appellant which can serve as a trustworthy index of his capacity to give a free and informed plea of guilt. The age, socio-economic status, and educational background of the appellant were not plumbed by the trial court. The questions were framed in English yet there is no inkling that appellant has a nodding acquaintance of English. It will be noted too that the trial court did not bother to explain to the appellant the essential elements of the crime of rape with homicide.

A cursory examination of the questions of the trial court to establish the voluntariness of appellant's plea of guilt will show their utter insufficiency. The trial court simply inquired if appellant had physical marks of maltreatment. It did not ask the appellant when he was arrested, who arrested him, how and where he was interrogated, whether he was medically examined before and after his interrogation, etc. It limited its efforts trying to discover late body marks of maltreatment as if involuntariness is caused by physical abuse alone. Regretfully, it even turned a blind eye on the following damning entry on the June 13, 1994 Record of Events of the Iloilo PNP showing that after his arrest, the appellant was mobbed by inmates while in jail and had suffered hematoma

Likewise, the trial court's effort to determine whether appellant had full comprehension of the consequences of his plea is fatally flawed. It warned the appellant he would get the mandatory death penalty without explaining the meaning of "mandatory" It did not inform the appellant of the indemnity he has to pay for the death of the victim. It cautioned appellant there ". . . will be some effects on your civil rights" without telling the appellant what those "effects" are and what "civil rights" of his are involved.

Appellant's plea of guilt is void and the trial court erred in using it to sentence him to death. We stress that under the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, a conviction in capital offenses cannot rest alone on a plea of guilt. Section 3 of Rule 116 requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt, the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. This rule modifies prior jurisprudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. The change is salutary for it enhances one of the goals of the criminal process which is to minimize erroneous conviction. We share the stance that "it is a fundamental value determination of our system that it is far worse to convict an innocent person than let a guilty man go free."

 

 

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