Sixto Bayas and Ernesto Matuday v. The Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 143689-91, November 12, 2002

FACTS:

On May 6, 1999, three Informations were filed before the SBN, charging Petitioners Ernesto Matuday and Sixto Bayas with violation of Section 3(e) of RA No. 3019, as amended; and two counts of malversation through falsification penalized under Article 217, in relation to Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. They were charged in their capacities as municipal mayor and municipal treasurer, respectively, of the Municipality of Kabayan.

During their arraignment on September 21, 1999, petitioners pled "not guilty." The pretrial conference scheduled on October 15, 1999 was cancelled and reset to November 5, 1999, because the counsel for the accused, Atty. Jose Molintas, was not prepared. On November 5, 1999, the pretrial was again cancelled because of the absence of Atty. Molintas, who was allegedly "suffering from the flu." Nonetheless, the Sandiganbayan urged the accused to discuss with their counsel the stipulation of facts drafted by Ombudsman Prosecutor II Evelyn T. Lucero. They were asked to do so, so that at the resumption of the pretrial on December 10, 1999, they could expeditiously pass upon all other matters that still remained to be resolved.

On December 10, 1999, the parties submitted a "Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents," which had been duly signed by the two accused (herein petitioners), Atty. Molintas and Prosecutor Lucero.

On January 14, 2000, the pretrial conference was again scuttled due to the absence of Atty. Molintas. The hearing was rescheduled for February 14, 2000. However, on February 7, 2000, he moved to withdraw as counsel for the accused. His motion was granted by the anti-graft court in an Order dated February 14, 2000. In the same Order, the pretrial was rescheduled for March 31, 2000, to give the accused ample time to employ a new counsel.

On April 26, 2000, the accused, represented by their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia Cinco, moved to withdraw the Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. Specifically, they sought to withdraw, first, Stipulation 1(b) which states that "Both the accused admit the disbursement of the amount of P510,000.00 and P55,000.00"; and second, Exhibits "1" to "8-a". They invoked their constitutional right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

The Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ Motion.

 

ISSUE:

Whether the law on pretrial requires the issuance of a pretrial order to make pretrial stipulations binding

 

RULING:

NO. Section 2 of Rule 118 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 2. Pre-trial agreement. -- All agreements or admissions made or entered into during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court.

Based on the foregoing provision, for a pretrial agreement to be binding on the accused, it must satisfy the following conditions: (1) the agreement or admission must be in writing, and (2) it must be signed by both the accused and their counsel. The court’s approval, mentioned in the last sentence of the above-quoted Section, is not needed to make the stipulations binding on the parties. Such approval is necessary merely to emphasize the supervision by the court over the case and to enable it to control the flow of the proceedings.

Once the stipulations are reduced into writing and signed by the parties and their counsels, they become binding on the parties who made them. They become judicial admissions of the fact or facts stipulated. Even if placed at a disadvantageous position, a party may not be allowed to rescind them unilaterally; it must assume the consequences of the disadvantage. If the accused are allowed to plead guilty under appropriate circumstances, by parity of reasoning, they should likewise be allowed to enter into a fair and true pretrial agreement under appropriate circumstances.

There is another cogent reason why the Joint Stipulation should be binding. It must be noted that the SBN could not fully act on the matter, not through its fault, but because of the continued absence of petitioners’ counsel. Verily, the records reveal that at the intended completion of the pretrial on January 14, 2000, it could not pass upon the Joint Stipulation because he was absent. Also, the pretrial conference had to be re-scheduled six times, just to ensure the attendance of the parties and their counsels and to prepare them for the conference.

Therefore, under these circumstances, the SBN cannot be faulted for its failure to approve expressly the stipulations. It had the opportunity to rule on the matter only when the accused, through their new counsel, Atty. Cecilia Cinco, moved to withdraw their stipulations. In its first assailed Order, the SBN upheld their validity, thereby effectively approving the submitted Joint Stipulation of Facts and Documents. The assent of the court to agreements of the parties, assisted by their counsel, is assumed until they indicate a dissent. Thus, the stipulations freely made by the latter are to be respected as their true will and intention with regard to the facts and evidence of the case, especially if the anti-graft court has not struck them down for being violative of the law.