Transfield Philippines v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, G.R. No. 146717, November 22, 2004
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent Luzon Hydro Corporation entered
into a Turnkey Contract whereby petitioner undertook to construct a hydro-electric
power station at the Bakun River.
To secure performance of petitioner's obligation on time,
petitioner opened in favor of LHC two standby letters of credit.
In the course of the construction of the project, petitioner
sought various extensions of time to complete the Project. LHC denied the
requests, however. This gave rise to a series of legal actions between the
parties which culminated in the instant petition.
As petitioner had anticipated the LHC sent notice to
petitioner that pursuant to the contract, it failed to comply with its
obligation to complete the Project. Both banks informed petitioner that they
would pay on the Securities if and when LHC calls on them.
LHC asserted that additional extension of time would not be
warranted. At the same time, LHC served notice that it would call on the
securities for the payment of liquidated damages for the delay.
Petitioner as plaintiff sought a restraining order from the
RTC, which was denied.
Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
submitted to the appellate court that LHC's call on the Securities was
premature considering that the issue of its default had not yet been resolved
with finality by the CIAC and/or the ICC.
Upon the expiration of the temporary restraining order
issued by the CA, the LHC trooped to ANZ Bank and withdrew the total amount of
US$4,950,000.
On 2 February 2001, the appellate court dismissed the petition
for certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether
LHC has the right to call and draw on the securities before the resolution of
petitioner's and LHC’s disputes by the appropriate tribunal
RULING:
YES.
The LHC has the right rooted in the Contract to call on the Securities.
Of course, prudence should have impelled LHC to await
resolution of the pending issues before the arbitral tribunals prior to taking
action to enforce the Securities. But, as earlier stated, the Turnkey Contract
did not require LHC to do so and, therefore, it was merely enforcing its rights
in accordance with the tenor thereof. Obligations arising from contracts have
the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in
good faith. More importantly, pursuant to the principle of autonomy of
contracts embodied petitioner could have incorporated in its Contract with LHC,
a proviso that only the final determination by the arbitral tribunals that
default had occurred would justify the enforcement of the Securities. However,
the fact is petitioner did not do so.
With respect to the issue of whether the respondent banks
were justified in releasing the amounts due under the Securities, this Court
reiterates that pursuant to the independence principle the banks were under no
obligation to determine the veracity of LHC's certification that default has
occurred. Neither were they bound by petitioner's declaration that LHC's call
thereon was wrongful. To repeat, respondent banks' undertaking was simply to
pay once the required documents are presented by the beneficiary.
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