Transfield Philippines v. Luzon Hydro Corporation, G.R. No. 146717, November 22, 2004

FACTS:

Petitioner and respondent Luzon Hydro Corporation entered into a Turnkey Contract whereby petitioner undertook to construct a hydro-electric power station at the Bakun River.

To secure performance of petitioner's obligation on time, petitioner opened in favor of LHC two standby letters of credit.

In the course of the construction of the project, petitioner sought various extensions of time to complete the Project. LHC denied the requests, however. This gave rise to a series of legal actions between the parties which culminated in the instant petition.

As petitioner had anticipated the LHC sent notice to petitioner that pursuant to the contract, it failed to comply with its obligation to complete the Project. Both banks informed petitioner that they would pay on the Securities if and when LHC calls on them.

LHC asserted that additional extension of time would not be warranted. At the same time, LHC served notice that it would call on the securities for the payment of liquidated damages for the delay.

Petitioner as plaintiff sought a restraining order from the RTC, which was denied.

Petitioner elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioner submitted to the appellate court that LHC's call on the Securities was premature considering that the issue of its default had not yet been resolved with finality by the CIAC and/or the ICC.

Upon the expiration of the temporary restraining order issued by the CA, the LHC trooped to ANZ Bank and withdrew the total amount of US$4,950,000.

On 2 February 2001, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari.

 

ISSUE:

Whether LHC has the right to call and draw on the securities before the resolution of petitioner's and LHC’s disputes by the appropriate tribunal

 

RULING:

YES. The LHC has the right rooted in the Contract to call on the Securities.

Of course, prudence should have impelled LHC to await resolution of the pending issues before the arbitral tribunals prior to taking action to enforce the Securities. But, as earlier stated, the Turnkey Contract did not require LHC to do so and, therefore, it was merely enforcing its rights in accordance with the tenor thereof. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good faith. More importantly, pursuant to the principle of autonomy of contracts embodied petitioner could have incorporated in its Contract with LHC, a proviso that only the final determination by the arbitral tribunals that default had occurred would justify the enforcement of the Securities. However, the fact is petitioner did not do so.

With respect to the issue of whether the respondent banks were justified in releasing the amounts due under the Securities, this Court reiterates that pursuant to the independence principle the banks were under no obligation to determine the veracity of LHC's certification that default has occurred. Neither were they bound by petitioner's declaration that LHC's call thereon was wrongful. To repeat, respondent banks' undertaking was simply to pay once the required documents are presented by the beneficiary.

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